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A BAD ARGUMENT FOR A GOOD CASE:





This paper is inspired by Thomas Pogge’s book World Poverty and Human Rights. Pogge 
explores the moral implications of  the extent and severity of  world poverty for us —the citizens 
of  affluent countries. In doing so, he assumes the familiar distinction between positive and 
negative duties. As Pogge puts it:
There are two ways of  conceiving such poverty as a moral challenge to us: we may be failing to 
fulfill our positive duty to help persons in acute distress; and we may be failing to fulfill our more 
stringent negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the unjust 
impoverishment of  others. (Pogge 2008 203, italics in original) 
While negative duties are acknowledged by a vast majority of  Western ethical and political 
thinkers, positive duties are often contested as unjustified or supererogatory. Pogge, in his attempt 
to argue that eradication of  world poverty is morally required, goes on to argue that we are failing 
to fulfill our negative duties towards the global poor. Thus, his argument is designed to convince 
adherents of  a lot of  different schools of  thought that action against poverty is necessary.
Relying for a start on a common sense understanding of  the distinction between negative 
and positive duties, I will explore Pogge’s argument. Then, by looking at various accounts of  
how the positive/negative distinction could be spelled out, I will show that Pogge’s argument 
fails to establish that the citizens of  the affluent countries are violating their negative duties 
towards the global poor. However unfortunate a result for Pogge’s argument that might be, it is 
not devastating for the case of  duties towards the poor. As I will scrutinize the aforementioned 
accounts of  the positive/negative distinction it will turn out that this distinction cannot be 
upheld. We therefore need a different account of  duties, one that will do away with the artificial 
sharp line between negative and positive duties. I will gesture towards such an account at the 
end of  my paper and suggest that on such an account we will have reason to accept that we do 
have a duty to help the global poor.
2. POGGE’S ARGUMENT
Pogge wants to establish that citizens of  the affluent countries are violating their negative duties 
towards the global poor by upholding an institutional order that results in severe poverty. The 
worse-off  are not merely poor and often starving, but are being impoverished and starved under 
our shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their lives (cf. Pogge 2008 207.) To 
substantiate that claim, Pogge’s argument needs to take two major steps: firstly, he needs to show 
that the institutional arrangements in question are really unjust; secondly, he needs to show that the 
citizens of  the affluent countries are truly the bearers of  responsibility for these arrangements.
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2.1 An Unjust Global Order
I shall give an account now of  how Pogge argues for the first of  these steps. In my 
presentation of  the argument, I will follow the structure given in chapter 8 of  World Poverty 
and Human Rights. The Argument starts with an explication of  what he understands by the 
term ‘radical inequality’. Pogge proposes that for a situation to constitute a case of  radical 
inequality five conditions must be met: the worse-off  are very badly off  in absolute (1) as 
well as in relative (2) terms. Furthermore, the inequality has to be impervious (3), pervasive 
(4) and avoidable (5) (cf. Pogge 2008 204-205.)1 As Pogge points out, world poverty today meets 
these criteria.2 However, this does not settle the question yet. Radical inequality is not in itself  
unjust as the ‘Venus case’ shows: suppose we discovered people on Venus who are badly off  in 
a way that would constitute radical inequality between us and them (id. 204.) Presumably there 
are few who would think that there was something unjust going on in this case. An additional 
condition is needed therefore to mark the current situation as unjust. This condition is that 
there is a causal link between the conditions of  the rich and the poor. Pogge offers three ways 
of  making that step. These three are intended as independent routes to the same conclusion, 
i. e. three different ways of  specifying our causal responsibility for the radical inequality. So 
buying any single one of  them amounts to accepting Pogge’s claim that the extent of  world 
poverty makes it the case that we are living in an unjust world. Pogge labels those routes 
(a) “the effect of  shared social institutions” (id. 205), (b) “uncompensated exclusion from 
the use of  natural resources” (id. 207), and (c) “the effects of  a common and violent 
history” (id. 209.) I shall discuss these arguments briefly in turn, starting with (c). 
2.1.1 A Violent Common History
Pogge argues that radical inequality is unjust if  it is the result of  a history in which moral 
rules have been massively violated. He alludes here to Robert Nozick’s third principle of  justice, 
 the principle of  rectification of  injustice in holdings (cf. Nozick 1974 152.) The thought is that 
even someone who believes, as Nozick does, that no degree of  inequality can be unjust as long 
as it came about by legitimate means has to acknowledge that world poverty is unjust because it 
is the result of  a shared history in which the ancestors of  the rich have exploited those of  the 
poor in morally impermissible ways. As Pogge puts it:
This is not to say (or to deny) that that affluent descendants of  those who took part in 
these crimes bear some special restitutive responsibility toward impoverished descendants 
of  those who were victims of  these crimes. The thought is rather that we must not uphold 
extreme inequality in social starting positions when the allocation of  these positions 
depends upon historical processes in which moral principles and legal rules were massively 
violated. (Pogge 2008 209)
To be sure this sounds plausible enough. However, contrary to what Pogge claims this 
rationale cannot stand independently of  other reasons that condemn radical inequality. To see 
1 I do not go into the details here, as this is rather peripheral for the purposes of  this paper.
2 The only condition that might be contested is avoidability (5). Pogge tackles that question in the more practically 
minded parts of  his book. In my opinion he argues convincingly that (5) is met. In any case, for the purpose at hand I will 
set aside those practical matters and simply assume that Pogge is right.
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this, imagine for a moment that the same morally deeply tarnished history had resulted in perfect 
equality. It seems unlikely that someone would argue that (parallel to Pogge’s claim) “we must 
not uphold equality in social starting positions when the allocation of  these positions depends 
upon historical processes in which moral principles and legal rules were massively violated”. 
This shows that Pogge’s argument derives its plausibility from the commonsensical notion that 
there is something intrinsically wrong with radical inequality. By itself, therefore, the argument 
from shared violent history does not establish that the radical inequality that we witness today 
is unjust. Rather this argument assumes what it is to supposed to show and does therefore not 
constitute an independent route to Pogge’s conclusion. 
2.1.2 Exclusion From Natural Resources
Consider next (b) —uncompensated exclusion from the use of  natural resources—. Following 
the tradition of  John Locke, Pogge argues that radical inequality is unjust if  it violates the condition 
of  the so called “Lockean proviso”. So, applied to the situation of  world poverty, the claim is:
The better-off  enjoy significant advantages in the use of  a single natural resource base from whose 
benefits the worse-off  are largely, and without compensation, excluded. (Pogge 2008 208)
Put briefly, the Lockean proviso expresses the idea that every human being has a right 
to “as much and as good” a share of  the natural resources of  our shared environment as 
everyone else. If  arrangements are made such that some end up with less than their fair 
share, these people have to be compensated so that they are at least as well off  as they would 
have been under an equal distribution. Pogge asserts that it is clearly the case that the global 
poor are not compensated in such a way (cf. Pogge 2008 208-209.) Whether this argument is 
valid hinges on the interpretation and acceptance of  the Lockean proviso. Different people 
have criticized it on different grounds, and at least according to some it is not a sufficient 
condition to classify poverty related starvation as unjust (cf. Malthus 1992, Ehrlich 1990.) I 
tiptoe around that issue here. I don’t think this Lockean way of  establishing radical inequality 
as unjust is very promising but I cannot here rule it out. However, in what follows, I shall 
concentrate on what I conceive to be the best of  the three strategies Pogge offers: (a) the 
effect of  shared social institutions.
2.1.3 Shared Institutions
As I do not intend to attack this step of  the argument, I shall only briefly outline the main point 
without going into the niceties of  Pogge’s discussion. The main point to be asserted is this: 
The global poor live in a worldwide states system based on internationally recognized territorial domains, 
interconnected through a global network of  market trade and diplomacy. The presence and relevance 
of  shared institutions is shown by how dramatically we affect the circumstances of  the global poor 
through investments, loans, trade, bribes, military aid, sex tourism, culture exports, and much else [...]. 
In sharp contrast to the Venus case, we are causally deeply involved in their misery. (Pogge 2008 205) 
This fact, together with the conditions of  radical inequality and the further (counterfactual) 
condition that without this shared institutional order radical inequality might not prevail, is 
supposed to establish that the current global institutional order is an unjust one. I am ready to 
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admit this point to Pogge, I think it is true. This means that Pogge is well on his way to establish 
that we are violating our negative duties towards the global poor.
2.2 From an Unjust Order to Guilty Individuals
Well on his way, but not yet there. To drive home his point, Pogge still needs to establish 
that the fact of  an unjust global institutional order implicates that ordinary citizens of  the 
affluent countries are actually violating their negative duties. Why not just say that politicians, 
lobbyists, and international corporations are violating such duties? After all, intuitively it 
does not seem to be the case that I am participating in enforcing any institutional order upon 
anyone, while I am sitting here writing this paper. The question Pogge has to answer is how 
the existence of  an unjust institutional order translates to a violation of  negative duties on 
the individual level.
The traditional distinction between positive and negative duties is easy to grasp as it relies on 
the common sense plausibility of  the “difference between making something happen and allowing 
it to happen” (Rachels 2001 947.) Negative duties are duties that prohibit us from a particular 
course of  action, e. g. killing. Positive duties on the other hand, prescribe a particular course of  
action, e. g. helping someone who would die without our help. In other words, negative duties can 
be fulfilled by leaving the other party alone. Negative duties are more or less uncontroversially 
acknowledged in ethical and political theory, whereas positive duties are contested for example 
by certain libertarians (cf. Narveson 2003.) I will spell out the distinction more clearly in section 
3, for now this intuitive notion should suffice.
2.2.1 Mere Profiting
First of  all, I want to dismiss the thought that an agent can violate his negative duty by 
merely profiting from an unjust institutional order. It seems at times that Pogge is alluding to 
this kind of  argument, even though he does not explicitly endorse it. The argument would be 
somewhat analogous to John Rawls’s argument that everyone profiting from a just institutional 
order has the duty to behave cooperatively under its scheme (cf. Rawls 1971 108-14.) However, 
Rawls’s argument is fallacious and the application to the case of  an unjust institutional order 
does not strengthen its case. To see that, consider the following case: suppose your neighbour’s 
house burns down. A necessary condition for this to happen is the fact that this house is situated 
in an environment with a lot of  atmospheric oxygen. Furthermore, you are clearly profiting 
from this fact, as you could not survive otherwise. Nevertheless, I take it to be uncontroversial 
that these facts do not establish that you are responsible for the fire. Analogously, if  I am merely 
profiting from the global institutional order (which I clearly am) but not actively participating 
in imposing or upholding it, I cannot be held responsible for the negative effects it might have 
on others. To be fair to Pogge, he seems to recognize this, even though he sometimes equivocates 
about the issue.3 Consider the following passage where Pogge discusses the moral responsibility 
of  an ordinary citizen in a slaveholder society:
3 “[W]e are [...] related to them [the global poor] as supporters of, and beneficiaries from, a global institutional 
order [...]” (Pogge 2008 123.)
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Even if  I owned no slaves or employed no servants myself, I would still share responsibility: by 
contributing my labour to the society’s economy, my taxes to its governments, and so forth. I might 
honour my negative duty, perhaps by becoming a hermit or an emigrant, but I could honour it more 
plausibly by working with others toward shielding the victims of  injustice from the harms I help 
produce or, if  this is possible, toward establishing secure access [to the objects of  human rights] 
through institutional reform. (Pogge 2008 72)
In this passage, Pogge vindicates the hermit who is presumably still profiting from the 
institutional order.4 He acknowledges the point therefore that it has to be contributing to rather 
than merely profiting from an unjust institutional order which amounts to a violation of  negative 
duty. The task therefore becomes to show that I am actually actively participating in imposing 
or upholding the unjust global institutional order.
2.2.2 Silent Cooperation
The passage quoted in the last section hints at a possible way to break down the injustice 
of  the institutional order to a violation of  duties on the individual level: contributing labour 
to the economy and taxes to government are things that ordinary people do and that help to 
stabilize the existing order. The thought seems to be that cooperative behaviour in an unjust 
system is enough to become guilty of  the harms it produces. This comes out even clearer in 
the following passage:
The responsibility of  persons is, then, indirect  —a shared responsibility for the justice of  any 
practices one helps to impose: one ought not to cooperate in the imposition of  a coercive institutional 
order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to protect 
its victims and to promote institutional reform. (Pogge 2008 176) 
I think it is pretty easy to see that most people do engage in this kind of  “silent 
cooperation” towards the existing global order (this is true for people in the affluent countries 
as well as in the third developing countries). Before going on to consider the claim that 
this is enough for Pogge’s argument to fly, let’s have a look at a stronger requirement that 
Pogge alludes to.
2.2.3 Active Participation
Consider the following passage from chapter 5 in which Pogge considers the negative effects 
certain global arrangements have on local factors in the developing world:
As ordinary citizens of  the rich countries, we are deeply implicated in these harms. We authorize 
our firms to acquire natural resources from tyrants and we protect their property rights in resources 
so acquired. We purchase what our firms produce out of  such resources and thereby encourage 
them to act as authorized. (Pogge 2008 148) 
Here, Pogge seems to claim a more active role for the ordinary citizens of  the affluent 
countries. We are not merely silently cooperating in an unjust system. Rather, we are “authorizing, 
protecting and purchasing” and thereby assuming an active role in the imposition of  the unjust 
4 For example, the hermit profits from an institutional order which makes it unlikely that people will come to his 
hermitage and steal his food.
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order. However, it is not clear to what extent Pogge wants to commit himself  to this sort of  
claim. Consider the following passage:
This does not mean that we should hold ourselves responsible for the remoter effects of  our economic 
decisions. These effects reverberate around the world and interact with the effects of  countless 
other such decisions and thus cannot be traced, let alone predicted. Nor need we draw the dubious 
and utopian conclusion that global interdependence must be undone by isolating states or groups 
of  states from one another. But we must be concerned with how the rules structuring international 
interaction foreseeably affect the incidence of  extreme poverty. The developed countries, thanks 
to their vastly superior military and economic strength, control these rules and therefore share 
responsibility for their foreseeable effects. (Pogge 2008 206)
In this context the question arises as to what is meant by ‘foreseeable.’ If  Pogge has an objective 
notion of  foreseeable in mind then it seems difficult to argue that someone who lacks the ability to 
foresee the foreseeable is morally blameworthy. To make this argument one would have to give up the 
notion that “ought implies can.” If  on the other hand we talk about a subjective notion of  ‘foreseeable’, 
Pogge’s argument loses its sting. Very few ordinary citizens are actually able to foresee for example 
the effects that international treaties have on developing countries. Thus, on a subjective interpretation 
of  ‘foreseeable’, most ordinary citizens are vindicated —clearly not the result Pogge wants.
2.3 Summary
Let me summarize. I considered three possible ways of  breaking down the injustice of  the 
global institutional order to the level of  the individual citizens in the affluent countries: profiting, 
silent cooperation, and active participation. In Pogge’s arguments all of  these can be found, often 
intricately intertwined. However, Pogge only commits himself  clearly to the argument from silent 
cooperation. This is a wise choice as the argument from profiting is fallacious and the argument 
from active participation hinges on a doubtful notion of  ‘foreseeable’. In the next section, I will 
consider whether the argument from silent cooperation is successful in showing that those who 
silently cooperate are violating negative duties.
3. SILENT COOPERATION AND NEGATIVE DUTIES
First, it seems noteworthy that if  the argument from silent cooperation succeeds this will 
have a surprising implication: not only will it be established that the citizens of  the affluent 
countries are violating their negative duties, but also we will have to conclude that those citizens 
of  the developing countries who are not working towards a global reform will likewise violate 
those duties towards their equally poor fellows. This is so, for silent cooperation towards the 
global order takes place in the third world as well as in the first. Maybe this is the reason why 
Pogge at times alludes to the arguments from profiting and active participation. But let me 
set this issue aside for now, there are more serious problems with the argument from silent 
cooperation.5
5  It might be thought that the point I am setting aside here is in fact very substantial and amounts to a reductio 
of  Pogge’s argument. However, I don’t take it to be an insurmountable objection. I can see at least two ways around it: (i) 
the poor cannot but violate their negative duties which does not hold true for the rich; (ii) even though everyone, the rich 
and the poor, are violating their negative duties alike, it is only the latter who have the means to make up for this violation 
of  duty.
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Recall the notion of  negative and positive duties I gave before in section 2.2. I said that negative 
duties prohibit a certain course of  action whereas positive duties prescribe a certain course 
of  action. However, in assessing whether silent cooperation in the unjust global institutional 
order constitutes a case of  violation of  negative duties, the distinction between negative and 
positive duties needs to be spelled out more explicitly. This is anything but a trivial task. I will 
look briefly at three proposals. The first one is the intuitive but naive notion that the crucial 
difference lies in the (absence of) intentionality, the second one is a proposal by Jan Narveson, 
and the third one is taken from Jonathan Bennett. I will show how on all these three proposals 
silent cooperation does not constitute a case of  violation of  negative duties. However, this is 
not a fatal blow for Pogge’s case, as I will also show that none of  these proposals works. I will 
show this by demonstrating that they do not deliver the right results in certain cases. In what 
follows, I will not differentiate among the distinctions between negative versus positive duties 
on the one hand, and acting versus letting happen on the other. It is therefore crucial to keep in 
mind how these two are related: negative duties assume that an agent can be held responsible 
only when he is acting, whereas positive duties assume that an agent can be held responsible also 
for letting happen (failure to act).
3.1 Intentionality6
A first stab7 at what marks the difference between acting and letting happen might go like 
this: we are actively bringing something about if  and only if  it was our intention to bring it 
about. Now, if  that were the correct way of  drawing the distinction between acting and letting 
happen, it would be pretty clear that I, as an ordinary citizen, am not violating my negative 
duties towards the global poor. In cooperating silently with the institutional order, I am not 
intending to harm anyone. Therefore, Pogge’s argument would fail. Things are not that easy, 
however. To see that intentionality cannot be the crucial feature for making this distinction, 
consider the following case: I walk up to my favourite hotdog vendor and see that he is about to 
close and has only one hotdog left. As I ask him to sell me the hotdog, he says he had sold it to 
this other guy already who is standing next to me. As I really want to have the hotdog, I push 
the guy and he falls into the vendors knife slicing his throat. Now, I did not intend to kill the 
guy, I merely intended to get my hotdog, so on the intentionality criterion I have not killed him. 
However, it is clear that in this case I should count as having killed him and therefore we need 
a different criterion for the distinction.
3.2 Narveson’s Criterion
Jan Narveson puts forward a proposal that relies on a counterfactual consideration. I count 
as merely letting something happen, if  and only if  the outcome would have been the same if  I 
had not been around (cf. Narveson 1999 70.) On this criterion too, Pogge’s argument fails. If  I 
would not do what I am doing right now, the world’s poor would not be any better off  than they 
6 It is crucial to keep in mind that the position I am going to attack in this section is the position that intentionality 
can serve to mark the distinction between acting and letting happen. This is different from the position that intentionality 
itself  is morally salient. My arguments in this section do not address this latter position.
7 I assume that this ‘first’ stab takes place after even more naive proposals like ‘movement of  the body’ have been 
ruled out for obvious reasons.   
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are now. Note that I am not relying on the claim here, that if  I would not do what I am doing 
someone else would do exactly what I am doing. However, were this claim true, it would not 
lift the weight of  the moral responsibility from my shoulders. Rather, my claim is that the 
global poor would not be any better off  if  I would not exist and no one would take my spot. 
To this, Pogge would probably reply that if  nobody would do things similar to the things I am 
doing, the world’s poor would be better off. Furthermore the fact that a change of  behaviour on 
my part would not change anything does not make my behaviour any more legitimate. Pogge 
gives the analogy of  two factories located at the same river which both dispose some chemical 
substance into the water. Each of  these substances on its own would cause only slight damage 
to the environment, however as they mix they become highly detrimental. Pogge argues that 
in this case both factories bear the responsibility for the whole damage caused and not only 
for the slight damage their substance would cause on its own. I agree with Pogge’s assessment 
of  this case, however, this is a bad analogy for the case at hand. If  one of  the factories would 
stop disposing its substance into the water, the damage to the environment would decrease 
dramatically regardless of  what the other factory does. The case of  my silent cooperation in 
the unjust global order is quite disanalogous. If  I would stop cooperating, the global order 
would not become any more just unless a significant amount of  other individuals would do 
the same. Hence, the analogy does not show what it is supposed to show. As things stand, 
silent cooperation does not amount to a violation of  negative duties on Narveson’s criterion.
Narveson’s criterion, however, does not work. Consider the following case: I am a member of  
a squad of  soldiers which is supposed to execute a captive. There are five of  us and we are all 
required to shoot a bullet in the captive’s head upon a certain signal. The signal comes, I shoot, 
and half  a second later the captive is dead with five bullets in his head. Have I killed him? The 
correct answer has to be: ‘yes’. However, this is not the answer Narveson’s criterion delivers. 
The counterfactual consideration holds. Had I not been around, it is clearly the case that the 
captive would be dead anyways, even if  no one had taken my place.8 Narveson’s criterion fails 
to deliver the right answer in these kinds of  cases, we must therefore look for a better way of  
drawing the distinction.
3.3 Bennett’s Criterion
One of  the most sophisticated treatments of  the positive/negative distinction can be found in 
Bennett’s The Act Itself. He uses the example of  an agent that causes/lets happen a car accident. 
Now, what makes Agent’s conduct positively relevant to the disaster is this: of  all the ways in which 
he could have moved, only a tiny proportion were such as to lead to the vehicle’s destruction; 
virtually all would have had its survival as a consequence (cf. Bennett 1995 94-95.) Bennett uses 
the language of  “positively relevant” and “negatively relevant” to describe what I have called 
“acting” and “letting happen.” This means that in Bennett’s language we are violating a negative 
duty, if  our actions are positively relevant to a certain bad outcome. Bennett’s suggestion is that it 
is the ratio of  the number of  possible movements that lead to a certain outcome to the number of  
possible movements that do not lead to that outcome which gives us the criterion we are after.
8 I set aside the question whether a soldier is responsible for his actions when following orders. If  you are worried 
about this, you can change the case to a group of  friends (rather nasty people) murdering an innocent child in the same 
way.
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There is something noteworthy about this proposal: it seems that instead of  a clear cut 
distinction between acting and letting happen what we have now is a gradual scale. The fewer 
of  my possible ways of  moving will lead to a certain outcome the more positively relevant will 
my action be to that outcome when I decide to move in one of  those ways. This means that we 
would not only have to consider positive versus negative duties but also a more fine grained 
distinction such as “moderately negative” versus “highly negative” duties.
On Bennett’s criterion, the question in regard to Pogge’s argument becomes this: to what degree 
are my movements positively relevant to the suffering of  the world’s poor? The answer is that they 
are so only to a negligible degree. Of  all my possible movements only very few (I actually have a 
hard time of  thinking about a single one) will not result in the suffering of  the global poor. That 
means that also on Bennett’s criterion Pogge’s argument fails again. Bennett’s criterion does not 
render silent cooperation in the unjust global order a violation of  negative duty.
However, Bennett’s criterion is flawed. Consider the following case: I wake up from hypnosis 
and find myself  tied to a fixed rifle that aims at your head. You are unconscious and I have no 
way of  waking you up. My right index finger is taped to the highly sensitive trigger and I know 
that as I did not have my usual morning beer my hands will soon start shivering which will 
lead to your death. There is only one way of  avoiding this, namely, I can use the scissors in my 
left hand to cut the tape and take my hand from the gun. Even though this is the only way of  
avoiding your death it’s not difficult, it would be a snap. However, I think about all my possible 
movements and choose a different one. The trigger goes off  and you die. Have I killed you? As 
in the case above about the member of  the shooting squad, the answer has to be ‘yes’. However, 
Bennett’s criterion delivers the following answer: “my action was positively relevant to your 
death only to a negligible degree.” Bennett’s criterion delivers the wrong answer in this case, 
and thus it cannot be correct.9
3.4 Summary
Where are we now? We have seen that once the distinction between negative and positive 
duties is spelled out, Pogge’s claim that the ordinary citizens of  the rich countries, through their 
silent cooperation in an unjust global order, are actively harming the global poor, fails. However, 
we have also seen that, despite its common sense plausibility, this distinction is incredibly hard to 
draw. I believe that Pogge’s argument gets off  to the wrong start when he asserts that: “I agree 
, on this point with libertarians [...] that the distinction between actively causing poverty and 
merely failing to prevent it is morally significant” (Pogge 2008 15.) By subscribing to the positive/
negative distinction, Pogge inherits the huge problems faced by everyone who wants to rely on 
it. Nevertheless, Pogge’s claim that our duties towards the global poor are more weighty than 
we usually think they are, is compelling and a lot of  the arguments he provides are strong. In 
the remainder of  this essay I shall gesture towards a way of  reconstructing Pogge’s argument 
on a notion of  duties that does not rely on the dubious positive/negative distinction.
9 In fairness to Bennett, he does not intend his criterion to provide a distinction between positive and negative 
duties, but merely a distinction between acting and letting happen. That is to say that he might not subscribe to the clear 
cut relation between the two distinctions that I sketched at the end of  section 3.
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4. A NEW SCALE OF DUTIES
I shall take Bennett’s criterion as my point of  departure. Even though the criterion fails in the 
light of  certain cases, I believe that Bennett is on the right track. Remember that Bennett’s 
criterion left us with a continuous scale instead of  a sharp divide between active and passive 
involvement. He arrived at this by using the ratio of  the number of  possible movements 
resulting in a certain outcome to the number of  possible movements not resulting in that 
outcome. We are more actively involved in bringing about the outcome in question the 
smaller that ratio is. We can reformulate that by saying that we are more actively involved in 
bringing about an outcome the higher the number of  possible movements is that we forego 
in order to bring it about. In yet other words: the higher our opportunity costs for bringing 
about a certain outcome the higher our level of  active involvement. When we apply this 
sort of  reasoning to a scale of  duties we get: the higher our opportunity costs for bringing 
about a certain outcome, the less weighty our duty to bring it about. Note that all of  this 
is still Bennett’s criterion.
It is now easy to see what is missing. In a situation relevant to an outcome that involves 
me and you it cannot be enough to take into account my opportunity costs for acting in a 
certain way. We also have to consider the effects of  my choices on you. This points towards a 
consequentialist interpretation of  duties. Instead of  prohibiting or prescribing certain action 
types, we would measure the weight of  moral duties on a continuous scale that takes into account 
the costs for everyone who is affected. This is the way Peter Singer approached the question 
of  world poverty in his famous article Famine, Affluence, and Morality (cf. 1993 ch. 8.)10 He draws 
the extreme conclusion that we should aid the needy (roughly) as long as there are significant 
differences in the respective levels of  standard of  living. This is the result one will get, if  one 
interprets the scale of  duties that is envisaged in the preceding paragraph in a certain way. This 
interpretation relies on the classical utilitarian idea that everyone’s well-being should count 
for the same. Hence, the scale of  duties is interpreted as impartially adding the good and bad 
effects on all affected individuals. Classical utilitarianism, however, is not the only option in the 
consequentialist field.
A particularly interesting variation comes from Samuel Scheffler. In The Rejection of  
Consequentialism, he argues for the notion of  an ‘agent centered prerogative’ (cf. Scheffler 1994 
166-70.) Applied to the scale of  duties this idea would amount to a method like this: when deciding 
how weighty a particular moral duty is, we must look at the consequences the action in question 
has for every individual involved. However, that is not the end of  the story, for this will not be 
an impartial weighing process but rather a certain level of  partiality towards the agent has to 
be allowed. On this notion of  duties then, we can start arguing —in agreement with Pogge— 
that our duties towards the global poor are weightier than most people think; basically because 
it would cost us so little to make such a big difference to the better.
10 Note that Singer is still holding to his extreme conclusions. In his new book he accounts for certain features of  
human nature, which seem to make it impossible to be completely impartial between oneself  and others. However, this 
does not figure into his conclusions about what is required by morality. Rather, he concludes that humans are unable to 
live truly moral lives (cf.  Singer 2009.)
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I cannot fully discuss the notion of  the scale of  duties that I have sketched here. However, 
a couple of  comments are in order. First, there is the question of  how an agent centred 
prerogative could be justified. I believe that the answer to this question will involve questions 
of  identity. Roughly speaking, it seems impossible to develop an identity, without at least 
some partiality towards oneself.11 Secondly, there is the question whether the agent centred 
prerogative will just involve partiality towards the agent herself  or whether the partiality 
will spread out in concentric circles (i. e. some partiality towards oneself, some less partiality 
towards one’s family, some even less partiality towards one’s friends and so on.) This is an 
interesting question, and again I think identity issues will play a big role in approaching it. 
Related issues are the questions of  how much partiality towards the agent would be appropriate 
and how and by who those assessments would have to be made. There remains a lot to be done 
for a fuller treatment of  the scale of  duties I have envisaged. For now, I do not have answers 
to this kind of  questions.
5. CONCLUSION
I started out to discuss the plausibility of  Pogge’s arguments for a duty to end world 
poverty. It became clear that Pogge’s argument in its strongest form amounts to the claim 
that the citizens of  the rich countries, by silently cooperating in an unjust global order, are 
actively harming the global poor and are thereby violating their negative duties towards 
them. I showed that this claim is hard to maintain by testing it against various criteria 
for the distinction between negative and positive duties. All of  these criteria rendered 
Pogge’s claim false. However, as I further showed, those criteria are inadequate as they fail 
to deliver the right results in certain cases. By induction, I concluded that the positive/
negative distinction is a distinction that cannot withstand scrutiny. Starting from what I 
called Bennett’s criterion, I then sketched a proposal for a different scale of  duties. Instead 
of  a binary scale (negative/positive), I suggested a continuous scale which renders duties 
more or less weighty depending on the opportunity costs for the agent and the effects on 
other affected individuals. Although I was not able to give a full account of  such a scale 
here, I believe that the proposal is very promising. Furthermore I believe that it will enable 
us to preserve the good parts of  Pogge’s argument. In its new form the argument would 
be articulated roughly as follows: the citizens of  the rich countries, by silently cooperating 
in an unjust global order, are violating weighty duties towards the global poor, and those 
duties are significantly more weighty than they are usually taken to be.
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